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In early December, the U.S. President brought together the leaders of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo for a truce. His pledge was an end to long-standing fighting in the unstable eastern DRC, framing it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations to generate significant profit.

Weeks later, however, a starkly different approach to conflict emerged. It was declared that U.S. forces had carried out Christmas Day airstrikes in north-west Nigeria, striking sites linked to the Islamic State (IS). In a social media post, the President declared, My prior warnings indicated these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

A Clear Change of Direction

This dichotomy highlights the defining feature of the U.S. policy towards sub-Saharan Africa in this period: a moving away from promoting democracy and human rights in favor of a declared focus on trade and stopping hostilities—despite the fact that this squares with the nascent aerial operations in Nigeria remains to be seen.

“Our view has shifted from Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a slogan commonly used for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” declared a senior U.S. diplomat in a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

A presidential representative reinforced this, saying the President “views Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American capital, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations achieve stability, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Consequences and Mixed Signals

This shift is consequential, but experts note it is too soon to assess its effects. The approach is influenced by the President’s unconventional diplomacy, which has included disputes with long-standing U.S. partners and derogatory comments about Africans.

“The core tenet is, if it’s in the long-term or short-term interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” said a scholar for Africa studies at a prominent foreign policy council.

Notable policy moves have included:

• Dismantlement of the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. A study predicts this could lead to millions of preventable deaths globally by 2030, with a large number in Africa.
• Enacting visa restrictions on citizens from more than two dozen African countries and stopping most refugee admissions.
• Starting a global tariff campaign that has adversely affected African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Allowing a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to expire without renewal.

Geopolitical Disinterest and Strains

Differing from his immediate predecessors, the President never visited sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His most infamous engagement with African affairs was referring to nations on the continent with a derogatory term, which he later confirmed using.

“Africa sits at dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for him, but for the administration in general,” remarked the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which gave only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A notable disagreement has erupted with South Africa, reportedly shaped by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The claim of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa fits perfectly now in U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” noted a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Quid Pro Quo Relations and Conditional Action

A comparable standoff flared with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This ran up against Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation composed between Christians and Muslims and riven with security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts suggested that the stern rhetoric may have pushed the government into greater action on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had consented to the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

Trump has publicly expressed his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has mediated in the Congo conflict and dispatched a diplomat to try to forge a peace deal in Sudan’s civil war, so far without success. While the Congo deal appeared to have been broken quickly, it “helps to at least introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” argued one conflict expert.

A Resemblance to Competitors

Observers describe the new U.S. approach as reminiscent of that of global rivals like Russia and China, who have deepened their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on commercial interests.

“This is a delayed recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” commented one foreign policy analyst.

Ultimately, the current policy likely means that “an African country that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The engagement that we are talking about isn't about spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a transactional posture towards Africa,” the journalist concluded.